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Should the child be examined and where?
The child should be examined but not without
the knowledge and agreement of a parent (or the
order of a court). Mothers of preadolescent
children should always be invited to be present,
except in the most exceptional circumstances.
Adolescent patients should be asked whether
they wish a parent to be present.
It is usually counterproductive to examine a
resistant child, and if his or her cooperation
cannot be obtained the examination should be
deferred unless there are urgent medical reasons
to proceed.
The child should be examined as soon as
optimal arrangements can be made. Few children
require urgent examination.
Repetitive examination is usually abusive and
should be avoided.
The examination should be conducted in
absolute privacy and in an environment where
the child can be comfortable-not behind screens
in open wards or in police stations.
There should be adequate equipment for any
necessary diagnostic tests. Recording and
photographic facilities are an advantage but their
value is outweighed if they cause distress to the
child or mean that another examination has to be
conducted.
Who should examine?
A person with skill in paediatric examination
who is familiar with normal genital and anal
appearances of children should conduct the
examination. When physical abnormalities
are expected from the history a forensic physician
should be invited to examine or to be present
during the examination so that it need not be
repeated and a second opinion is available in
doubtful cases.
Who should be present?
The only people present at the examination
should be the child, his or her parent, and the
examiner(s)-no one else-except, with the
agreement of the parents, an occasional observer
in training.
What about acute sexual abuse?
When abuse is thought to have been recent
(within 72 hours) or there is serious genital injury
forensic evidence must not be compromised.
Examination should be deferred, if consistent
with safety, until a forensic physician can be
present. Nobody should remove clothing or
attempt to clean or bath the child. Junior medical
staff should not examine suspected victims unless
the child urgently needs medical attention.
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For Debate
Patient preferences and randomised clinical trials
C R Brewin, C Bradley
Allocating patients to different treatments by rando-
misation in a controlled trial is now accepted almost
without question in accounts of trial design.' Rando-
misation may reasonably be supposed to play a large
part in evaluating proposed studies for grant support.
The virtue of randomisation is that it reduces some
types of systematic error that may interfere with the
interpretation of the results of a trial. Allocating
patients to treatments in a systematic non-randomised
way may introduce bias which destroys comparability.
We argue here that despite this advantage random
allocation is not always suitable. Though patients play
an active part in the outcome of all treatments, we
suggest that clinical trials in which they are required to
sustain an effortful and demanding role and those in
which they are likely to have strong preferences for
one treatment need to be considered and conducted
differently.
Motivation
Patients' motivation to follow treatment regimens is
likely to be influenced by any preference before
treatment is begun for one particular course of action.
The greater the need for participation the greater is the
scope for motivation to influence outcome. Such
"participative" interventions include self monitoring,
diet, ar4d self medication regimens for patients with
diabetes; rehabilitation programmes for patients
recovering from a myocardial infarction; counselling
for patients with cancer or those at high risk of
passing disorders to their offspring; behavioural and
cognitive treatments for anxiety and depression; and
deinstitutionalisation programmes for chronically
mentally ill and mentally handicapped patients.
The success of many, but particularly participative,
interventions depends further on the patients'
perceptions of their suitability and on patients'
willingness to help to make them succeed.2 If
effectiveness is evaluated after random administration
to patients who may or may not desire the treatment it
will be difficult to distinguish between a treatment that
failed because it was not inherently effective and one
that failed because it was not targeted towards patients
who understood why that treatment was given or who
were suitably motivated. Traditionally, motivation
was seen as a characteristic of the patient which, it was
assumed, did not change with the nature of the
treatment offered. If this is the case then conventional
randomisation ensures that different groups contain
equal numbers of those who are "well" motivated and
"poorly" motivated. With participative interventions,
however, it seems more realistic to view motivation in
terms of the "fit" between the nature of the treatment
and the patient's wishes and perceptions. If an
attempt is not made to achieve a good fit misleading
underestimates of effectiveness are likely to result.
Information
Consider the case where the investigator wishes to
compare two treatments of which at least one is
participative. If patients are randomly allocated to
treatments the investigator may draw conclusions
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about their relative efficacy only if it is assumed
that motivational factors are equally important or
unimportant in the two groups. If patients are not
informed that they are taking part in a trial or about the
side effects, discomfort, inconvenience, disruption to
routine, and the length of time and amount of effort
entailed for both arms of the trial then it will not be
possible to elicit whether the assumption is justified.
Thus for trials of this kind it is vital to give patients
sufficient information.
It may be argued that matching on motivational
variables can be achieved by providing information
and then including only patients who are fully
informed and who are then willing to accept random
allocation. In practice patients may still have strong
preferences for one form of treatment and may, for
example, agree to participate because this is the only
way that they stand a chance of receiving a new or
experimental treatment4 or because they are hoping to
be allocated to a particular and preferred group.
Thus despite having full information and giving
consent patients may still find themselves allocated
to non-preferred treatments, which lowers their
motivation to make the treatment work. Biased
estimates of effectiveness would then be apt to occur.
The alternative ... design is to
optimise motivation by ascertaining
patients' preferences.
Random allocation may work in participative trials if
treatments are viewed as similar by patients who have
no preferences and the investigator wishes to test a
difference in some component that is assumed to be
central to the mode of action of the treatment and thus
crucial to its success. Many trials of participative
interventions, however, are not of this kind. There are
many ways of helping cardiac patients to recover, of
helping people with insulin dependent diabetes
to control their blood glucose concentrations, and of
encouraging patients to manage symptoms of anxiety
and depression, just as there is a variety of possible
community settings into which mentally ill or
handicapped patients may be discharged. The aim of
each intervention is clear. The issue is how it can best
be achieved. Often participative treatments educate
and motivate patients to manage or adapt to their
condition without assuming that there is only one
correct way. For example, in cognitive therapy for
depression5 the heterogeneity of patients is explicitly
recognised and specific techniques are prescribed and
adapted to individual need.
Explanatory and pragmatic attitudes
Our argument is related to the distinction between
explanatory and pragmatic attitudes to the design and
conduct of clinical trials.6 In explanatory trials the aim
is to reduce the possible differences between the two
arms to a minimum to be able to pinpoint what makes
one treatment better or worse. In pragmatic trials
the objective is to discover which of two different
"packages" of management gives better results even
though the importance of the individual components
of the package cannot necessarily be identified.
Most treatments are complex, consisting of a mix of
supposedly active components with contextual factors
such as, for example, the way the treatment is given,
side effects and their management, and auxiliary
care. In explanatory trials the contextual factors are
"equalised" by randomisation and often also by
imposing artificial restraints on their presence. In
pragmatic trials the contextual factors are optimised,
so approximating to actual practice. We suggest that
with participative interventions the contextual factors
include motivational concerns such as the patient's
belief in and preference for one kind of treatment over
another. Pragmatic designs which capitalise on rather
than ignore the differences between patients and ask
what the most suitable intervention is under optimal
motivational conditions are therefore most suitable to
test participative interventions. For example, we could
fit patients to treatments by asking them to select the
one that in their opinion suits them best. We illustrate
this alternative to random allocation by considering
research into two different illnesses-introducing
insulin infusion pumps in the self management of
diabetes mellitus and introducing counselling after
surgery for women with breast cancer.
Choosing the most suitable treatment
SELF MANAGEMENT OF DIABETES MELLITUS
Continuous subcutaneous infusion of insulin is a
relatively recent development in managing diabetes.
The question about its possible value is pragmatic: Can
its use be recommended in preference to or in addition
to other treatment regimens? Not all patients with
poorly controlled blood glucose concentrations find the
technique attractive -for example, because of the need
to wear a pump strapped to the body. When given a
choice between this and more familiar methods many
patients do not select this method.7 Therefore with
random allocation there will always be a risk that the
groups will not be matched for motivational variables,
and, strictly speaking, random allocation should be
done only for a group of patients who at the outset have
no preference for either the new or the old treatment.
The evidence suggests that it would be hard to find
sufficient patients who were unconcerned about the
method of insulin delivery and that either a trial would
therefore not be possible or the subjects would be
unrepresentative. Furthermore, randomising patients
to a treatment they do not want will increase the
dropout rate and thus limit the conclusions that can be
drawn.'
In the most suitable design, therefore, motivational
factors would be optimised by letting patients select
their preferred method. This was done in the Sheffield
feasibility study,7 when after an introductory explana-
tion about the options patients chose continuous
subcutaneous insulin, or a conventional self injection
regimen, or an intensified version of the second. By
giving these choices the investigators were able to
include almost an entire clinic population in the study
and thus achieve a high degree of representation.
Because the study was designed in this way the results
cannot tell us about the relative efficacy of the three
treatments for any patients with diabetes requiring
insulin, but they can tell us whether a new technique is
a viable option for patients who choose to use it and
whether it would be good for them because their blood
glucose concentrations would be better controlled
compared with baseline measures. During this study
the preferences of patients were a focus of interest, and
the factors that determined choice were explored. As a
result, recommendations were made for more suitable
education to enable patients to judge which treatment
would best suit their needs and priorities."
COUNSELLING AFTER SURGERY
The ethical issues concerned in a randomised trial
of counselling versus no counselling for patients
undergoing mastectomy when entry into the trial was
not subject to informed consent were raised some
time ago"' and again recently." 1 There is a need to
BMJ VOLUME 299 29 JULY 1989314
know if counselling is effective, but randomisation
implies that counselling must be shown to be better
than no counselling regardless ofwhether patients wish
to be counselled. It would be easy to imagine that the
two groups (counselled and not counselled) contain
equal numbers of patients who would like to be
counselled and those who wish to get on with their lives
without counselling. One group is then counselled and
the other is not. In each the patients whose wishes are
met demonstrate better psychological adjustment than
those whose wishes are contravened, and the overall
adjustment of the two groups is about the same. In
such a study the conclusion that is likely to be reached
is that the efficacy of counselling has not been proved,
though an internal analysis taking into account the
wishes of the patients would lead to a different
conclusion.
Irrespective of the possibility of getting a "wrong"
answer by failing to consider attitudes, a randomised
trial of counselling against no counselling without an
attempt to ascertain the patients' wishes is logical
only if one of two assumptions holds. One is that
counselling will be effective whether or not the patient
wants it and participates in it-a premise that few
counsellors would claim to be justified. The other
is that patients' preferences for or against are homo-
geneous. They are (a) all against it, in which case the
trial is probably a waste of time, or (b) uniformly
indifferent to whether they are counselled or not,
which seems unlikely, or (c) all for it, which is perhaps
the most plausible form of homogeneity. Should the
last be true, however, then it is scarcely justifiable
except on grounds of resources for withholding it from
some patients in the interests of a clinical trial.
The alternative and perhaps more suitable design is
to optimise motivation by ascertaining patients'
preferences. Patients who have no preference are then
randomly allocated to counselling (group A) or no
counselling (group B). Two further groups would
include patients who chose counselling (group C) and
those who did not wish it (group D). These groups
would give an estimate of the value of the intervention
per se (A v B) and of the additional influence of
motivational factors (A v C and B v D). If group C did
much better than group D, or vice versa, then it might
be necessary to ask if the outcome was a result of self
selection bias or if it represented a genuine treatment
effect. The implications for providing care might
include advocating one form of care despite an initial
lack of enthusiasm from the patient. We contend,
however, that such a case could be made only after a
study of the kind that we describe was undertaken.
Conclusion
We argue that simple randomised controlled trials
may not always be suitable to evaluate participative
interventions. Though the purpose of randomisation is
to ensure equal distribution of all factors, including
motivational ones, among the two or more arms of a
trial, this will not necessarily be achieved, particularly
when the patient prefers one of the treatments. The
pragmatic question of which treatment is more useful
under what are judged to be optimal conditions of
motivation should be considered as a legitimate
alternative to the explanatory, but sometimes un-
realistic, question ofwhich is the best treatment per se.
Investigators must be clear which class of question
each kind of trial can and cannot answer. Problems
of interpretation are bound to arise when trials of
participative treatments are designed as though they
are drug trials without considering the different
psychological processes concerned in each.
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MATERIA PARAMEDICA
The toss of a coin: how to advance your career
I have known of appointments committees that were equally divided in the
members' preference between two suitable candidates. A vacancy has to be
filled; there is no time to reconvene another committee, and either
candidate is acceptable. The toss of a coin is then a quick way of creating a
much needed bias. This may seem a bit hard on the loser, but who can tell
where one's luck lies? The following story shows an unusual twist on this
unusual theme.
In 1930 the London County Council (later the GLC) took over 89
backward, underfunded hospitals from the Metropolitan Asylums Board
and the Boards of Guardians. Sir Frederick Menzies was in charge, and the
immense task of upgrading the hospitals and equipment and staff was
completed within three years. Among the new staff were two able young
surgeons. One day, in the course of their duties, a patient had to undergo
amputation of a finger. The surgeons tossed a coin to decide who would
operate and who would give the anaesthetic. In those days, despite
improved staffing in municipal hospitals, one had to be a jack of all trades;
anaesthetists were a rarity. The coin was tossed, and the surgeon whom I
shall call KN gave the anaesthetic, while DR amputated the finger.
Unfortunately, he removed the wrong finger. The authorities at County
Hall were not amused. KN and DR were candidates for the post of medical
superintendent.
The medical superintendent of a London County Council hospital was
provided with a large house, rent and rates free, with heating, gas,
electricity, and laundry thrown in for good measure. In due course a
vacancy was advertised and KN got the job. It was my privilege to work
under him: an able administrator, a gentle disciplinarian, and scrupu-
lously fair. He ran the course and retired at age 65.
But what happened to DR? County Hall decided that he should wait.
Eventually he was made superintendent at a hospital in north London.
Now, it was the London County Council's policy to create specialised units
at various general hospitals, and a goitre clinic was established at the north
London place, later renamed the Thyroid Clinic. Here DR worked with
the best thyroid surgeons of the day, Cecil Joll, Thomas Dunhill, and
Geoffrey Keynes; and, on the medical side, with Raymond Greene. DR's
status as a surgeon on the thyroid and thymus (for rfyasthenia gravis) was
greatly enhanced and he was created CBE. So much, then, for the toss of a
coin. -BERNARD J FREEDMAN
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